Binmore, K.G.; Samuelson, L.; (1994) An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 150 (1) pp. 45-63.
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This paper seeks to close the gap between the models of man used by economists and sociologists. The problem of the evolution of social norms is identified with the equilibrium selection problem in game theory. Adopting such a view requires that sociologists be ready to regard social norms as being endogenously determined, and for economists to abandon the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium in favor of an evolutionary approach. Even in simple situations like the Ultimatum Game, the consequences can be striking.
|Title:||An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms|
|Additional information:||This issue is not currently available online|
|Keywords:||B41, C72, A12|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics|
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