Griffith, R. and Neely, A. (2009) Performance pay and managerial experience in multitask teams: evidence from within a firm. Journal of Labor Economics , 27 (1) pp. 49-82. 10.1086/596324.
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Abstract
This article exploits a quasi‐experimental setting to estimate the impact that a commonly used performance‐related pay scheme had on branch performance in a large distribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, was implemented in all branches in one division but not in another. Branches from the second division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the Balanced Scorecard had some impact but that it varied with branch characteristics, and, in particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Performance pay and managerial experience in multitask teams: evidence from within a firm |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1086/596324 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/596324 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © 2009 by University of Chicago Press |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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