Heinaman, R (1993) Rationality, eudaimonia and kakodaimonia in Aristotle. Phronesis , 38 (1) 31 - 56.
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Abstract
I argue that Aristotle does not believe all rational action aims at securing eudaimonia (happiness) for the agent. Intrinsic goods are worth having independently of their promotion of any further ends, including eudaimonia. Aiming for such a good or avoiding evil may be rational even when eudaimonia is impossible and not the agent's goal. "Politics" 1332a7f suggests that even the happy agent may act rationally without aiming for eudaimonia. The final section argues that, given that an immoral agent secures the greatest of evils, an alleged conflict in the "Nicomachean Ethics" between the intellectualist Book X and earlier books disappears.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Rationality, eudaimonia and kakodaimonia in Aristotle |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Additional information: | Imported via OAI, 16:54:26 4th May 2005 |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Philosophy |
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